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The Elephant in the Room: Europe
in the 2015 British General Election
La grande absente: l’Europe dans les élections législatives de 2015
Pauline Schnapper
Europe has been a divisive issue in British politics for at least three decades, when the
ratification of  the Maastricht treaty opened divisions in the Conservative party after
decades during which Labour had been split on the question. Yet it has usually played a
very limited, if not insignificant, role in British general elections. When asked about their
main concerns, voters hardly ever mention Europe, but rather domestic issues such as the
economy, the NHS and immigration. 2015 was no exception to this rule, with only 6% of
voters mentioning the European Union (EU) as the most important issue for them, in
spite of the apparent rise of euroscepticism in the country.1 Politicians know that they
have little to gain therefore from tackling the issue, as William Hague learnt the hard way
when he tried to campaign to “Keep the Pound” against New Labour in 2001, and made no
electoral gain out of it.
Yet the 2015 general election could have been different because this time, the outcome of
the election was going to have dramatic consequences on the future of Britain in the EU.
In a speech on 23 January 2013,  David Cameron had promised to organise an in/out
referendum by the end of 2017 should the Conservatives win a majority in the House of
Commons in 2015. This was the result of on-going pressure both from some of his own
backbenchers and from UKIP, which made spectacular gains in second-order elections
between 2010 and 2015.  Neither Labour nor the Liberal  Democrats  had matched this
pledge, so the outcome of the general election could potentially change the course of the
history of Britain in Europe.
A debate on the EU could have been organized during the campaign, but this did not
happen. Beyond voter lack of interest, none of the three mainstream national parties
wished to say much about the EU for a number of reasons that will be explored in this
article. Europe was therefore very much the elephant in the room, looming large over the
campaign but hardly mentioned until the day after the election. 
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In order to explore both the importance of the issue and its low salience, I will first briefly
recall  the process by which,  in the course of  the five years of  coalition government,
Europe became again a divisive issue in the Conservative party, leading the government
to gradually become marginalised in the EU in ways which were not very different from
what happened under the last Conservative government, under John Major (1990-97). The
second section will look at the campaign itself and the way parties used or avoided the
issue. Finally, I will try to assess the consequences of the Conservative victory over the
prospect of “Brexit”, or British exit from the European Union.
 
Party Pressure and the Road to Isolation
David Cameron had tried to please the growing number of eurosceptics in his party in
opposition as early as his election as leader in 2005. He had pledged that Conservative
members of the European Parliament would leave the centre-right European People’s
Party,  deemed  too  federalist,  to  establish  a  new  eurosceptic  but  not  extreme-right
grouping. When the Lisbon treaty was signed by the Brown government in 2007, he had
demanded a referendum and when this proposal was turned down, William Hague, the
shadow Foreign Secretary, promised “not to let matters rest there”, although what he meant
by this exactly was never clarified.  Indeed Cameron abandoned the pledge when the
Lisbon treaty was ratified by all other member states, much to the dismay of his radical
eurosceptic backbenchers. He was therefore already on the defensive when he pledged in
the  2010  manifesto  to  introduce  a  bill  in  Parliament  which  would  require  any  new
transfer of power to Brussels to be subject to a referendum (Conservative Party 2010:
113). The party would also campaign for a repatriation of powers to the national level in
three areas: the Charter of Fundamental Rights, criminal justice and social legislation (p.
114). There was no mention of an in/out referendum at that stage or of other policies
which should be repatriated.
The Liberal Democrats agreed to the “referendum lock” clause in the coalition document
signed in May 2010 (HM Government 2010). In this case as on other European issues, their
attitude was low-key and their influence limited during the five-year coalition: when it
came to Europe, the difficult ‘coalition’ seemed to be between hard and soft Conservative
eurosceptics  rather  than  between  the  two  parties  in  power.  The  “lock”  was  duly
introduced in Parliament in the European Union Bill, which became an Act in 2011. But it
was not enough to satisfy the hardline eurosceptics, in particular the veteran MP Bill
Cash, who headed the EU Scrutiny Committee, and pressure grew within the party in
favour of an in/out referendum.2 In October 2011, a motion was introduced by David
Nuttall, a hard eurosceptic who was part of the new intake of Conservative MPs, following
an e-petition asking for a referendum which had gathered more than 100,000 signatures.
At that time the government was adamantly against the idea and imposed a three-line
whip  on  the  vote.  This  did  not  prevent  the  first  major  rebellion  on  Europe  since
Maastricht, with 81 Conservative MPs voting in favour of the motion (D’Ancona 2014, p.
243-244).
This domestic context explains to a large extent the first crisis between the Cameron
government  and its  European partners  at  the December 2011 European Council.  The
Prime Minister had already refused to take part in the bail-out packages for countries
such as Portugal and Spain which were affected by the sovereign-debt crisis. This time, he
opposed - without discussing it with Nick Clegg, his pro-European coalition partner – the
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fiscal  compact  proposed  by  the  other  member-states  in  order  to  strengthen  the
coordination of budgetary policies within the eurozone. Although not a member of the
eurozone and therefore not directly affected, he argued that it would be detrimental to
the interests of the City of London. This was hardly the ‘veto’ that he claimed, since the
other EU states went ahead with the plan outside the EU institutions, but it was a clear
signal that the British approach to EU affairs would be much more negative than under
the previous New Labour governments. 
In  July  2012,  Cameron  took  a  further  step  to  attempt  to  placate  the  Conservative
eurosceptics, some of whom were tempted to defect to UKIP. The government announced
that a “review of the balance of competences” between the national government and the EU
would be conducted across the different ministerial departments. This would examine for
each area whether the balance was right or whether the government should attempt to
repatriate powers to the national level. It would inform future decisions taken by the
government.  The  irony  of  this  exercise,  completed  in  summer  2014,  was  that  its
conclusions were broadly positive about the European Union and the balance between
Brussels and London, leading it to be quietly shelved and hardly commented on in the
(mostly eurosceptic) press.3
Cameron’s failure to please the hard eurosceptics became even more visible when on 31
October 2012 the government suffered its first parliamentary defeat on the EU budget.
Conservative hard eurosceptics joined Labour MPs in voting for a sharp reduction in the
EU budget, ringing enough bells in 10 Downing Street to prompt David Cameron to give in
on the prospect of a referendum. On 23 January 2013, Cameron delivered a speech in the
London Bloomberg headquarters  where he promised a  renegotiation of  the terms of
British membership of the EU if he won the 2015 general election, followed by an in/out
referendum in the UK by the end of 2017 (Cameron 2013). He mentioned the need for
more flexibility in Europe, less regulation and more power for national parliaments. The
parallel  with Harold Wilson’s  tactics  to keep the Labour Party united behind him in
1974-75  was  obvious  and,  indeed,  his  U-turn  was  very  well  received  by  Tory
backbenchers, who had attempted to introduce a number of Private Members’ bills with
similar aims.4
In the run up to the lifting of  restrictions on the free circulation of  Romanians and
Bulgarians in the EU on 1 January 2014, the issue of EU migrants came to the fore of the
British  debate,  leading  Cameron to  contemplate  imposing  controls  on  EU migration,
which is unlawful under the Single European Act.5 As German Chancellor Angela Merkel
reacted angrily that this could not happen, he backtracked and suggested first imposing
restrictions on so-called ‘benefit tourism’, then in late 2014 restricting migrants’ access to
welfare for several years (Cameron 2014). By then, he was under growing pressure from
UKIP, which in May 2014 had won the European elections and in the autumn secured the
defection of two Conservative MPs, thereby gaining its first two parliamentary seats.
Cameron’s second and equally unsuccessful battle with his European partners came after
the May 2014 European elections. New rules to make EU institutions more accountable
had been adopted  in  the  Lisbon treaty,  by  which  the main  parties  in  the  European
Parliament would choose a ‘leader’ who would then be appointed as the new President of
the  European Commission if  his/her  party  won a  majority  of  seats  in  the  European
Parliament elections. The leader of the EPP, which won the highest number of seats in
May 2014  was  Jean-Claude  Juncker,  the  former  Prime Minister  of  Luxemburg.  David
Cameron  decided  to  oppose  his  appointment,  arguing  that  it  ‘shouldn’t be  the
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Parliament’s role, but the heads of state and governments’, to appoint the President of
the Commission and that Juncker, as a federalist and representative of unpopular old-
style Brussels politics, was not a suitable candidate.6 But he failed to find allies in the EU,
in spite of early signals from Merkel as well as the Swedish and Dutch Prime Ministers
that they might not support Juncker. In the end, he called for a formal vote in the June
European Council in which he was outnumbered by 26 to 2, with only Hungary supporting
him.7
By the time of the 2015 general election, David Cameron had therefore given in to his
eurosceptic backbenchers by committing his party to a referendum on “Brexit”, although
he made clear he expected to win enough concessions from his partners to call for a yes
vote  to  stay  in  the  EU.  At  the  same  time  and  in  apparent  contradiction,  he  had
antagonised many of his European neighbours with a negative attitude to EU attempts to
strengthen integration in the midst of a deep economic crisis. He made few friends in the
EU in the process and lost those he had had in the past, Northern and Eastern Europeans
who would normally share his Atlanticist and economically liberal views but rejected his
anti-immigration rhetoric. He faced an uphill struggle to reverse the marginalisation of
his country in the EU and extract concessions from them.
 
The Campaign
On the day after the 7 May general election, the political debate returned immediately to
Europe and Cameron’s promise to organise a referendum, which was announced in the
Queen’s speech on 27 May, illustrating how crucial the issue was. Yet this stood in stark
contrast  to  the  campaign  itself,  where  Europe  was  hardly  present,  at  least  in  the
mainstream parties’ campaign.
As we have seen, David Cameron had agreed to a referendum in part to avoid eurosceptic
pressure  during  the  campaign  and  limit  the  damage  UKIP  could  do  to  his  electoral
chances. The Conservative manifesto therefore insisted that the party would “give you a
say over whether we should stay in or leave the EU”, but it was short on substantive issues,
except  to  pledge  to  “reform  the  workings  of  the  EU,  which  is  too  big,  too  bossy  and  too
bureaucratic; reclaim power from Brussels on your behalf and safeguard British interests in the
Single Market” (Conservative Party 2015). There was no need to be more explicit at that
stage,  and the less  the EU was talked about during the campaign,  with Conservative
divisions papered over in the short term, the less UKIP could pressurize and divide the
Tories. There was no discussion of the reforms which would need to be agreed in order to
support staying in the EU and Cameron was not really pushed on the issue by other
parties or journalists.
Their  coalition  partners,  the  Liberal  Democrats,  declined  to  promise  an  in/out
referendum, although in 2007 they were in favour of a referendum on the Lisbon treaty,
which they supported,  but  were not keen to raise the issue.  Traditionally more pro-
European than the two other main parties, and indeed than the British public at large,
they had also had a bruising experience when Nick Clegg confronted Nigel Farage, the
UKIP leader, in two televised debates in April 2014, which Clegg was widely seen as having
lost.8 Europe was not a vote-winner for the Lib Dems and their manifesto mainly repeated
a very general pro-EU stance,  qualified by equally vague criticism of the way the EU
worked, a view supposedly in tune with the mood of the country:
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Liberal  Democrats  want  Britain  to  remain  a  member  of  the  EU because  we are
fighting  for  a  stronger  economy  and  British  jobs…  But  that  doesn’t  mean  the
European Union is perfect: far from it. Liberal Democrats want to reform the EU so
that it concentrates on doing the things it’s good at such as creating jobs, fighting
climate  change  and  combating  cross-border  criminal  gangs,  but  stays  out  of
decisions  better  decided at  national,  devolved or  local  levels.(Liberal  Democrats
2015)
During the campaign, Clegg softened his opposition to the idea of a referendum, saying he
might accept it provided a number of conditions were met.9 He was by then hoping to be
in a position to negotiate another coalition with the Conservatives after the election, and
therefore wanted to keep all options open, knowing that this would be a red line for the
Tories. 
The Lib Dem manifesto was not very different from Labour’s, which stated that “because
Britain will be better off remaining at the heart of a reformed EU, Labour will make the hard-
headed, patriotic case both for reform in Europe, not exit from Europe” (Labour Party 2015). Ed
Miliband, its leader since 2010, insisted, like the Liberal Democrats, on the folly of “Brexit”
. But he was more on the defensive on this issue than Clegg because he had resisted the
pressure from inside and outside his own party to match Cameron’s promise to organise a
referendum.10 He had therefore no reason to make too much of the European issue, on
which  he  risked  being  accused  of  refusing  a  democratic  vote.  Indeed  he  appeared
awkward and uncomfortable when confronted on why he refused a referendum on EU
membership by a factory worker on the campaign trail in Lancashire.11 The two Labour
voices that were heard about Europe during the campaign were those of Gordon Brown
and Tony Blair,  the ex-Prime Ministers,  neither of whom stood anymore for election.
Brown published a  pro-EU article  in the Guardian and Tony Blair  delivered a  speech
criticising the Conservatives over Europe in his former Sedgefield constituency.12
As a result of the mainstream parties’ reluctance to mention the EU in the campaign, this
was left to what we call the successful insurgent parties in this journal issue, i.e. UKIP and
the Scottish National Party (SNP), although for different reasons. A British withdrawal
from the EU has been UKIP’s raison d’être since it was created in 1993. Its whole 2015
manifesto  was  based  on  the idea  that  this  would  solve  all  of  Britain’s  problems,  in
particular immigration, the economy and the NHS, as the first line of its introduction
clearly showed: “This manifesto is our blueprint for a Britain released from the shackles of the
interfering EU” (UKIP 2015). In the general election, Farage was hoping to gain at least a
handful more MPs on top of the two he had gained in 2014. In case of a hung Parliament,
he might  be  able  to  bargain his  support  for  a  minority  Conservative  government  in
exchange for an immediate referendum on ‘Brexit’. Mentioning Europe was also a way to
increase pressure on the Conservatives, who feared losing voters to UKIP in the south of
England.
In the case of the SNP, Europe was one area where the party could distance itself from all
unionist parties by making an unambiguously pro-European case. The manifesto opposed
withdrawal from the EU without the qualifications of Labour or the Lib Dems’ document:
At least 330,000 Scottish jobs – around one in seven of all jobs – are dependent on
our membership of the single market. That is why we will oppose a referendum on
membership of the EU. Being part of Europe is good for business and it supports
jobs in Scotland and across the UK. (SNP 2015)
Europe was also a useful tool to strengthen the nationalists’ case for independence. They
were able to turn the relatively more pro-European views of many Scots, confirmed in a
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number of polls, to their advantage.13 The simple argument was that if there was to be a
referendum in the UK about leaving the EU, the only certain way for Scots to remain in
the EU was to vote SNP and to support Scottish independence. Nicola Sturgeon repeated
several  times  that  in  case  of  Brexit,  all  parts  of  the  UK  should  vote  for  it,  asking
effectively  for  a  Scottish  veto  in  the  referendum  –  which  she  knew  the  British
government would never accept.14 In the Scottish leaders’ debate on 9 April, she explicitly
threatened to demand a second referendum on Scottish independence if the UK voted to
leave the EU.15 Europe was therefore once again a tool in the SNP’s overall strategy to
distance itself from Westminster politics and policies.16
 
Is Brexit more likely ?
The immediate effect of the general election results was that, with the new Conservative
overall majority in the House of Commons, a referendum on the future of Britain in the
EU is no longer just possible but now certain. David Cameron confirmed that it will take
place by the end of 2017 and possibly earlier, depending on the negotiations he is going to
start  with  his  European  partners.  After  Ed  Miliband’s  resignation  from  the  Labour
leadership, the party opted to support the referendum. The Queen’s speech announced
that:
My  government  will  renegotiate  the  United  Kingdom’s  relationship  with  the
European Union and pursue reform of the European Union for the benefit of all
member states. Alongside this, early legislation will be introduced to provide for an
in-out referendum on membership of the European Union before the end of 2017.17
The Prime Minister started a tour of European capitals to lay out a general list of UK
demands, without being too specific. Issues often mentioned involved a possible opt out
from the aim of ‘ever closer union’ which is in the European treaties; completing the
single  market  and  protecting  the  interests  of  the  City;  curbing  welfare  access  for
immigrants.  This  was  meant  to  keep  him  some  room  for  manoeuvre  both  for  the
negotiations and domestically. It was also a far cry from the ideas about fundamental
change in the relationship with the EU or the repatriation of substantial powers from
Brussels which had often been aired in the past, and this made success in the negotiations
more likely or less unlikely in the future. Similarly, it became clear as early as the 26 June
European Council, that there would be no treaty change in the EU before the referendum
took place.
Cameron’s main difficulty is going to be to find a compromise between what the radical
eurosceptics demand and what the European Union member states are able and willing to
grant him. At the moment the gap between the two looks difficult to bridge, so he will
aim to obtain enough substantial and symbolic concessions in Brussels to convince, not so
much the anti-Europeans, as enough British voters to win the referendum. Indeed, like
Wilson in the 1970s, resorting to a referendum is not just a way to please opponents to
membership of the EU but also the means to bypass their opposition, going directly to ‘the
people’.  But another possible comparison is with the Major years. Like Major after the
1992 general election, Cameron’s majority is already very small. This could give extra
leverage  to  the  eurosceptic  backbenchers,  like  Major’s  ‘bastards’  then,  to  harass  the
government. Furthermore, some radical eurosceptics, like Iain Duncan Smith or Boris
Johnson (who has sent ambiguous signals on the topic of Brexit) sit in the Cabinet, which
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was not the case in the 1990s. Cameron will have to walk a fine line to maintain at least
some of them on board in the run up to the referendum.
The outcome of the ballot is of course impossible to forecast in 2015. Opinion polls in 2014
and 2015 showed a slight majority of voters in favour of staying in the EU, especially if the
government achieved a successful negotiation. 18 But the general election showed that
polls were not always reliable. Furthermore, much will depend on Cameron’s results in
the negotiations, the popularity of his government when the vote takes place, the Greek
crisis  and the state of  the eurozone economies,  the strengths and weaknesses of  the
future ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns, that is a mixture of domestic and European factors. A
period of political uncertainty for Britain and for the EU has started.
 
Conclusion
Europe is going to dominate British political debate until the referendum on membership
of  the  EU  takes  place  sometime  in  2016  or  2017.  Yet  the  merits  or  otherwise  of
membership were never discussed during the campaign, except by Nigel Farage, the UKIP
leader, and Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP leader, two parties which were unlikely to become
part of  the UK government but exercised strong pressure on the traditional  political
system. None of the main three party leaders saw any compelling reason to mention it on
the doorsteps or in the national medias, both because voters did not seem interested and
because,  for different reasons,  they were all  on the defensive and preferred to avoid
talking  about  Europe  altogether,  thereby  postponing  the  discussion  to  a  future
referendum campaign.  Europe remains more than ever a difficult  question in British
politics,  bringing  trouble  to  all  mainstream  parties.  They  therefore  choose  the
conservative  attitude  of  not  mentioning  it  when they  can rather  than engaging  the
public.
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ABSTRACTS
Europe was hardly mentioned by the mainstream parties in the 2015 general election campaign
in spite of the fact that its outcome was going to have a dramatic impact on whether an in/out
referendum was going to be organised in the UK or not. For different reasons, it was not in the
interest of either the Conservatives, Labour or the Liberal Democrats to make much use of the
issue, leaving it to UKIP and, to a certain extent the SNP. In contrast to the election campaign,
Europe is now going to dominate the political debate until the referendum takes place in 2016 or
2017.
La  question  européenne  a  été  peu  abordée  par  les  principaux  partis  politiques  britanniques
pendant la campagne législative de 2015 malgré les conséquences importantes du résultat sur
l’organisation ou non d’un référendum sur le maintien dans l’UE. Pour des raisons différentes, ni
les Conservateurs, ni les Travaillistes ni les Libéraux-démocrates n’avaient intérêt à en parler,ce
qui a laissé le champ libre à UKIP et dans une moindre mesure le SNP. Contrairement à ce qui
s’est passé pendant la campagne, l’Europe va dominer le débat politique outre-Manche jusqu’au
référendum, en 2016 ou 2017.
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